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I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularization of Internet and advance of process of democracy of nation, a new voting system called Internet voting is introduced.
The secure and practical Internet voting protocols should have basic properties (privacy, completeness, soundness, unreusability, fairness, eligibility, and invariableness) and expanded properties (universal verifiability, receipt-freeness [1] , coercion-resistant [2] )
Receipt-freeness was introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra in the paper "receipt-free secret-ballot elections" [1] . The voting protocols are receipt-freeness that means the voter can't produce a receipt to prove that he votes a special ballot. Its purpose is to protect against vote buying.
Benaloh and Tuinstra proposed a receipt-freeness protocol based on voting-booth, but Hirt and Sako in [4] point out that their protocol is not receipt-freeness.
A lot of Internet voting protocols have achieved receipt-freeness through ad hoc physical assumptions and trusted third parties, such as, one or two way untappable channels and/or anonymous or private channels [4, 5, 6, 16] ; third-party (trusted) honest verifiers [7] ; smart cards [8] ; tamper-resistant machines [9] ; third party randomizers [10, 11, 12] ; voting booths [1, 13] , special visual encryption tools [14] , used deniable encryption [15] .
Reliance on ad hoc physical assumptions or trusted third parties is problematic, because it undermines the security, flexibility, robustness, trustworthiness, and ease of use of an election scheme.
Formal method is the key to assess receipt-freeness of internet voting protocols. Many universal formal methods have been proposed to analyze security protocols. Owning to specialties of internet voting protocol, Delaune et al [17, 18] and Jonker and Vink [3] introduce a formal method for analyze receipt-freeness of internet voting protocol respectively.
In the definition of receipt proposed by H.L. Jonker and E.P. de Vink, I think it is worth discussing. Firstly, about "(R1) r can only have been generated by v" in [3] , because in some voting protocol one part of receipt is generated by the authority, not generated by voter. Secondly, they give the following auxiliary receipt decomposition functions: " : Rcpt AT", which extracts the authentication term from a receipt. Authentication term should be the identification of voter. Thirdly the author does not prove the generic and uniform formalism that is right in their paper. Finally they use a special notation, it difficult to use and generalize it.
S. Delaune etc. also give the formal definition of receipt-freeness in the applied calculus. It mainly uses the observational equivalence in standard labelled bisimulation. But it does not define what a receipt consists of. A shortage of this formalism is that while it may be used to design a voting protocol with receiptfreeness, it offers little help to check receipts when these are present.
V. Kessler and H. Neumann logic [20] is a provable sound extension of AUTLOG in order to analyze the most important features of participants in electronic commerce protocols. In this paper we use V. Kessler and H. Neumann logic to construct a framework for receiptfreeness. Our approach focuses on establishing what can construct a receipt. This enables the identification of receipts, and provides a heuristic to take receipts into consideration in the early stages of designing a protocol. Our method is simple and it is easy to be generalized.
As is often done in protocol analysis, we assume the Dolev-Yao abstraction: cryptographic primitives are assumed to work perfectly, and the attacker controls the public channels. The attacker can see, intercept and insert messages on a public channel, but can only encrypt, decrypt or sign messages for which he has the relevant key. In the case of both receipt-freeness, we assume that the vote buyer has all the capabilities of the attacker on the public channels.
We briefly overview the Kessler and H. Neumann logic in Section II. Next, in Section , we formalize receipt-freeness. In Section and , we illustrate our ideas in terms of the protocol by Fujioka Atshushi et al [23] and the protocol by Meng Bo [19] . 
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Intuitively, a receipt in the voting system is evidence that can be used to prove that a voter casts a special ballot for a candidate to the vote buyer. This means that a receipt has the following information:
(Information1) receipt includes the evidence that can prove itself identification to the third party, such as registration authority, voter buyer and so on.
(Information2) receipt includes the evidence that can prove that a voter votes a special ballot for a candidate.
(information3) receipt includes the evidence that can prove that special voter, not other voter, votes a special ballot. In the following we give the definition of receipt based on V. Kessler , and can generate a special ballot ,and can prove the special ballot is voted by the voter who has the legal identification, , voter
Voter_ID Voter_ID buyer can prove voter said or can generate the receipt, which means that the voting protocol has not the receiptfreeness property.
The advantage of the above generic formal framework is that it covers all receipts. We can get a receipt from a particular execution of a voting protocol, also referred to as a run. The public and private information exchanged and the transcripts of information in the computer of A. FOO Voting Protocol voter during the protocol run can be considered a building block of an associated receipt.
FOO voting protocol consists of two authorities: an administrator and a collector. The administrator is responsible for token issuing; the collector collects the votes and publishes the result of the election. The protocol is composed of initialization stage, registration stage, voting stage, and counting stage. Figure 2 describes the FOO voting protocol.
. APPLICATION OF FOO VOTING PROTOCOL In this part we will present the voting scheme proposed by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta in 1992 [23] . FOO is a typical voting protocol. Many voting systems are developed based it, such as MIT EVOX voting system [21] ,Washington Sensus voting system [22] .First, we give an informal description, that is used as a basis for an formal description that follows. Then we analyze receiptfreeness with the framework proposed in this paper. At last we point that the protocol is not receipt-freeness At the end of the registration phase, the administrator announces the number of voters who where.
given the administrator's signature, and publishes the list . , , 
B. Informal Analysis of Rreceipt-freeness in FOO
Voting Protocol In the registration stage, the voter chooses a as the blind factor that only himself knows. 
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In order to proving that FOO voting protocol is receipt we need to prove that the following result: In this section we will present the voting scheme proposed by Meng Bo in 2007 [19] . First, we give an informal description, that is used as a basis for an formal description that follows. Then we analyze receiptfreeness with the framework proposed in this paper. At last we point that the protocol is receipt-freeness.
A. Meng Internet Voting Protocol
Meng Internet voting protocol is secure and practical and has the receipt-freeness and coercion-resistant. But it does not formally analyze receipt-freeness.
Meng Internet voting protocol accomplishes receiptfreeness by confidentiality of voter credential and designated verifier proof.
Meng Internet voting protocol consists of preparation phase, registration phase, voting phase and tallying phase.
In preparation phase authorities and voters generate the public/private ElGamal keys. The private keys of voter and authorities are secret Authorities generate the ballot and send and its digital signature to bulletin board denoted by BB. In voting phase receives and verifies it through the method in [19] . If the result is right, generates and send it to BB.
In tallying phase tallying authority TA tallies the ballot and publishes its results in BB.
B. Formal Analysis of Receipt-freeness in Meng Internet Voting Protocol
After an execution of the protocol the voter can send the message4-7 to vote buyer. Because the voter buyer can't know the authority' private key, he can't open the Proof is a proof that the is generated by authority. Voter checks equality between credential got from authority and credential in BB by proof of knowledge that two ciphertexts are encryption of the same plaintext . The other people cannot check owning to the specialty of designated verifier proof. Formal method is an important tool to assess receiptfreeness of internet voting protocols We proposed a formal logic framework for receipt-freeness based on V.
Kessler and H. Neumann logic. Our approach focuses on establishing what can construct a receipt. This enables the identification of receipts, and provides a heuristic to take receipts into consideration in the early stages of designing a protocol .Our method is simple and it is easy to be generalized.
Example of FOO voting protocol demonstrates that the protocol is not receipt-freeness. The receipt can be and . In order to make it receiptfreeness we can use tamper-resistant equipments such as usbkey, smart card and so on. Meng voting protocol is receipt-freeness.
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In the future we will work on give a formal framework of the coercion-resistance, eligibility, fairness, university verification, privacy, completeness, soundness, unreusability, and invariableness with the formal method
